A very sad Anniversary today
Discussion
I wasn't aware of this anniversary, but (as it happens) appropriately enough I recently read "Death for Desertion", covering the case of SLt Edwin Dyett of the Royal Naval Division - he was 21 when he was shot for 'absenting himself from duty' during the Battle of the Ancre.
It seems pretty clear to me that SLt Dyett did take himself AWOL rather than go to the fight, and without any evidence of shell shock, nervous breakdown or other factors. He abandoned a party of wounded soldiers of his own division that he encountered, rather than report their position and so risk being sent into the action himself.
It was, in the baldest sense of the term, cowardice.
But he was also badly (barely) represented at his court martial, and circumstantial evidence strongly implies that he was, to an extent 'done in' by the prosecution whose main witness likely harboured existing ill-feeling towards him.
Even when found guilty, the court recommended that his sentence was commuted. But he became a pawn in wider military politics - there were growing grumbles in the Army that the Other Ranks were being treated more harshly for cases of cowardice than officers. So there needed to be an example made to 'redress the balance'. And Dyett was a naval officer serving in a division under Army control and jurisdiction, thus making him an attractive target to be that example.
Thus he was informed that the recommendation for mercy had, in fact, not been actioned just a couple of hours before the deed was done. He would be one of only three officers shot by firing squad in the war - one the other two being a 2nd Lieutenant who deserted and evaded the authorities for several months, then fatally shot the military policeman arresting him.
It seems pretty clear to me that SLt Dyett did take himself AWOL rather than go to the fight, and without any evidence of shell shock, nervous breakdown or other factors. He abandoned a party of wounded soldiers of his own division that he encountered, rather than report their position and so risk being sent into the action himself.
It was, in the baldest sense of the term, cowardice.
But he was also badly (barely) represented at his court martial, and circumstantial evidence strongly implies that he was, to an extent 'done in' by the prosecution whose main witness likely harboured existing ill-feeling towards him.
Even when found guilty, the court recommended that his sentence was commuted. But he became a pawn in wider military politics - there were growing grumbles in the Army that the Other Ranks were being treated more harshly for cases of cowardice than officers. So there needed to be an example made to 'redress the balance'. And Dyett was a naval officer serving in a division under Army control and jurisdiction, thus making him an attractive target to be that example.
Thus he was informed that the recommendation for mercy had, in fact, not been actioned just a couple of hours before the deed was done. He would be one of only three officers shot by firing squad in the war - one the other two being a 2nd Lieutenant who deserted and evaded the authorities for several months, then fatally shot the military policeman arresting him.
2xChevrons said:
I wasn't aware of this anniversary, but (as it happens) appropriately enough I recently read "Death for Desertion", covering the case of SLt Edwin Dyett of the Royal Naval Division - he was 21 when he was shot for 'absenting himself from duty' during the Battle of the Ancre.
It seems pretty clear to me that SLt Dyett did take himself AWOL rather than go to the fight, and without any evidence of shell shock, nervous breakdown or other factors. He abandoned a party of wounded soldiers of his own division that he encountered, rather than report their position and so risk being sent into the action himself.
It was, in the baldest sense of the term, cowardice.
But he was also badly (barely) represented at his court martial, and circumstantial evidence strongly implies that he was, to an extent 'done in' by the prosecution whose main witness likely harboured existing ill-feeling towards him.
Even when found guilty, the court recommended that his sentence was commuted. But he became a pawn in wider military politics - there were growing grumbles in the Army that the Other Ranks were being treated more harshly for cases of cowardice than officers. So there needed to be an example made to 'redress the balance'. And Dyett was a naval officer serving in a division under Army control and jurisdiction, thus making him an attractive target to be that example.
Thus he was informed that the recommendation for mercy had, in fact, not been actioned just a couple of hours before the deed was done. He would be one of only three officers shot by firing squad in the war - one the other two being a 2nd Lieutenant who deserted and evaded the authorities for several months, then fatally shot the military policeman arresting him.
Very informative, thank you.It seems pretty clear to me that SLt Dyett did take himself AWOL rather than go to the fight, and without any evidence of shell shock, nervous breakdown or other factors. He abandoned a party of wounded soldiers of his own division that he encountered, rather than report their position and so risk being sent into the action himself.
It was, in the baldest sense of the term, cowardice.
But he was also badly (barely) represented at his court martial, and circumstantial evidence strongly implies that he was, to an extent 'done in' by the prosecution whose main witness likely harboured existing ill-feeling towards him.
Even when found guilty, the court recommended that his sentence was commuted. But he became a pawn in wider military politics - there were growing grumbles in the Army that the Other Ranks were being treated more harshly for cases of cowardice than officers. So there needed to be an example made to 'redress the balance'. And Dyett was a naval officer serving in a division under Army control and jurisdiction, thus making him an attractive target to be that example.
Thus he was informed that the recommendation for mercy had, in fact, not been actioned just a couple of hours before the deed was done. He would be one of only three officers shot by firing squad in the war - one the other two being a 2nd Lieutenant who deserted and evaded the authorities for several months, then fatally shot the military policeman arresting him.
It's difficult to judge these cases after such a long time, without a national emergency ongoing etc.
I've read a fair few such executions where the victim had been given multiple chances but was in fact a "wrong 'un". In an army of six million it's inevitable there would be many who either broke under the pressure (who can blame them?) or didn't like authority, weren't a team player etc so abandoned their post.
Despite what 60's historians and Black Adder would have you think the Generals and others responsible for managing military discipline and law weren't idiots back then. They were doing their best with conflicting and difficult circumstances. I suspect they largely got the balance right as judged at the time, but as with any justice system, some suffered that shouldn't have.
I've read a fair few such executions where the victim had been given multiple chances but was in fact a "wrong 'un". In an army of six million it's inevitable there would be many who either broke under the pressure (who can blame them?) or didn't like authority, weren't a team player etc so abandoned their post.
Despite what 60's historians and Black Adder would have you think the Generals and others responsible for managing military discipline and law weren't idiots back then. They were doing their best with conflicting and difficult circumstances. I suspect they largely got the balance right as judged at the time, but as with any justice system, some suffered that shouldn't have.
Scarletpimpofnel said:
It's difficult to judge these cases after such a long time, without a national emergency ongoing etc.
I've read a fair few such executions where the victim had been given multiple chances but was in fact a "wrong 'un". In an army of six million it's inevitable there would be many who either broke under the pressure (who can blame them?) or didn't like authority, weren't a team player etc so abandoned their post.
Despite what 60's historians and Black Adder would have you think the Generals and others responsible for managing military discipline and law weren't idiots back then. They were doing their best with conflicting and difficult circumstances. I suspect they largely got the balance right as judged at the time, but as with any justice system, some suffered that shouldn't have.
Indeed.I've read a fair few such executions where the victim had been given multiple chances but was in fact a "wrong 'un". In an army of six million it's inevitable there would be many who either broke under the pressure (who can blame them?) or didn't like authority, weren't a team player etc so abandoned their post.
Despite what 60's historians and Black Adder would have you think the Generals and others responsible for managing military discipline and law weren't idiots back then. They were doing their best with conflicting and difficult circumstances. I suspect they largely got the balance right as judged at the time, but as with any justice system, some suffered that shouldn't have.
The lions led by donkeys is such a dated and inaccurate trope. The reality is quite fascinating, especially when you consider how we moved from a small colonial army to a vast mechanised all arms force. Put this against the Germans, who had been building their Prussian staff college model, which as the war progressed, was partly their undoing.
hidetheelephants said:
Shooting people dead because they're frightened out of their wits is not rational behaviour.
True. But that very very rarely happened so odd you mentioned it. It's almost as if you are uninformed as to how military discipline was actually implemented back then and get your knowledge of history from Blackadder??Scarletpimpofnel said:
hidetheelephants said:
Shooting people dead because they're frightened out of their wits is not rational behaviour.
True. But that very very rarely happened so odd you mentioned it. It's almost as if you are uninformed as to how military discipline was actually implemented back then and get your knowledge of history from Blackadder??I think Most of us know how military discipline was implemented. Please explain why you think that was rational, justified or in any way defensible?
I don’t see how references to Blackadder are relevant .
Edited by bad company on Monday 27th July 09:41
bad company said:
The fact that it happened at all is tragic and deplorable.
I think Most of us know how military discipline was implemented. Please explain why you think that was rational, justified or in any way defensible?
I don t see how references to Blackadder are relevant .
Blackadder - as funny and poignant as it was - did history a disservice by cementing the "lions led by donkeys" view of the British Army in WW1, which was prominent in the 1950s and 1960s, was already being challenged by historians in the 1980s and is now mostly discredited.I think Most of us know how military discipline was implemented. Please explain why you think that was rational, justified or in any way defensible?
I don t see how references to Blackadder are relevant .
Edited by bad company on Monday 27th July 09:41
But moments like Haig sweeping model soldiers into the dustbin or "doing what we've done 17 times before is exactly the last thing Jerry will expect us to do this time!" are - respectively - grossly inaccurate representations of Haig (and how Haig's men viewed him - he was immensely popular to the extent that it was feared he would be the figurehead for a mass coup by WW1 veterans in the turmoil of the 1920s) and British high command doctrine (which was notable for never doing the same thing twice and always seeking some new development or tactic and taking onboard lessons from previous offensives that would deliver the breakthrough they needed).
Remember that only 18 men were literally shot for cowardice in the British Army in WW1. 260-odd were executed for desertion (which was often an act of perceived cowardice [like SLt Dyett in my earlier post] but also included those who just absconded themselves.
We don't know how many of these men were suffering 'shell shock', battle fatigue or PTSD. But we do know that far, far, far more men suffered and endured these traumas without deserting their posts, units, tasks and comrades.
Which is not to minimise or deny those things - many of those men dealt with their inward shame or inability to explore and explain their trauma in later life by self-medicating with alcohol or bouts of violence and emotional harshness with their families.
Contemporary reports and accounts show that most of the soldiers who served with men court-martialled for cowardice or desertion didn't express much sympathy. Being 'windy' was one of the great social sins of the trenches. Being scared was normal - showing it was inexcusable.
As I said in reference to SLt Dyett's case - he was let down in general by being placed in a situation he never wanted (joining the Navy to find himself in the trenches of the Somme) and was personally deeply unsuited to by temperament or character. And specifically by biases and shortcomings in his trial. But he absolutely displayed cowardice and deserted his post. Not just that but refused to help injured comrades to not risk being given fresh orders to go into action. Dozens of other RND SLts, certainly equally scared and unprepared, died in action just over a mile from where he hid out. His case - like so many of the others - is tragic war is full of tragedy. I certainly don't think he was innocent but he was certainly the victim of a miscarriage of justice and political inter-service interference.
The Army was fundamentally right that fear and indiscipline spreads like wildfire through a unit if it gets a grip in a single individual. Especially in the type of fighting predominant in WW1. The primary job of the NCOs and officers in an advance was to demonstrate fearlessness and drive it out of their men. That's why 20-year old subalterns twisted their guts and climbed over the parapet first, standing upright to light a cigarette or carry a walking or kick a football. That act of nonchalance - and it was always an act as their letters and diaries always reveal that they were terrified - was to be an example to the men and not let fear or excuse get a grip.
Clement Attlee was one of many officers who unabashedly told of threatening one of his own men with his service revolver when the lad hesitated to go up the ladder. After the softer and higher calls on his bravery had failed, Attlee gave him the choice of taking a chance against German bullets or a certainty against one of his. The private went over the top and survived.
hidetheelephants said:
I don't understand "because Blackadder"? Get a grip folks. Shooting people dead was a bad idea then and it's a bad idea now.
Was it? How can you get men to go through hell? What punishment, short of certain death, is worse than living and dying in a sodden ditch filled with s
t and the rotten remains of your friends, being shelled and shot at? Soldier's pride gets them through a suprising amount but all men will reach a point where discipline is needed to hold the line and make the difference between most of you surviving and a rout where everyone dies for nothing.
Most of the time the threat was enough, as a previous post mentioned with Attlee. But sometimes it isn't and if you don't follow through the whole thing caves in.
hidetheelephants said:
I don't understand "because Blackadder"? Get a grip folks. Shooting people dead was a bad idea then and it's a bad idea now.
The Blackadder relevance is because the idea that out-of-touch, stuffy British generals had young lads suffering from shellshock callously executed because they were assumed to be cowards is straight out of a type of historiography that lodged firmly in the public consciousness thanks to popular media like Blackadder and Oh, What A Lovely War. Both are, in their own way, beautiful, poignant and artistic. But they are very, very far from being historically accurate. How many people think that "useless upper-class twit generals in chateaux 20 miles behind the lines kept ordering men to walk slowly in lines across no-man's land into machine gun fire" is an accurate vignette of the WW1 Western Front? Loads. But it's a-historical rot.
I don't have the exact numbers in front of me but in WW1 the British Army executed 346 service personnel.
That included over 30 who were convicted of murder.
Something like 80 men were executed under a suspended sentence.
Only 18 men were executed expressly for cowardice.
About 260 were executed for desertion, quitting their post, falling asleep on sentry and similar charges. Some portion of these will have been 'genuine' (i.e. deliberately going AWOL to avoid military duties/refusing to soldier) - nothing to do with shellshock.
For the 346 men executed, they represent about 10% of the number sentenced to death (90% of sentences were commuted by high command).
Those 3000-or-so men are in turn about 10% of the number found guilty of charges that could carry the death penalty (the sentence was not applied).
And those men are a similar proportion of the total number of men court-martialled during WW1.
About 5.5 million men from the UK served in the Army during WW1 (over 8 million if we include the Commonwealth and Empire).
So the men shot for cowardice and desertion represent not only a tiny, tiny fraction (0.005%) of the men who served but still a tiny proportion (something like 0.08%) of the men who went through the court-martial system.
I have been to the National Memorial Arboretum and I have walked through the Shot At Dawn Memorial. It's very moving and humbling. Every one of those deaths is a tragedy. But so is every name on every war memorial throughout Britain, France, Flanders, Gallipoli and beyond.
But those 300 men do not represent some historical callousness among the general staff. While the entire Army structure prioritised the maintenance of order, discipline and fighting resolve (as it does now), and looked upon cowardice or shirking very poorly, it was not unthinking or unfeeling. It - and its leaders - knew that fear was natural and inevitable. That bravery requires fear to conquer (without fear it's not bravery). Training and doctrine aimed to instil fighting spirit and maintain it even when it flagged (it's hard to demonstrate fear when you're in the middle of a line of men you've trained, lived and served with for months and the line is inexorably moving forward, seemingly with its own momentum when it's actually the result of every man in a platoon taking one trembly step at a time as they see the chap next to him do the same).
And it was understood that most cases of 'windy-ness' or cowardice would be dealt with unofficially on the spot and would be transient. Often the men who showed reluctance to go over the top (like Attlee's private who needed 'encouragement') choked back their fear so much - or wanted to balance out the blemish on their reputation - that they actually committed incredibly brave acts just minutes after their officer or sergeant had to threaten them up the ladder.
Shellshock wasn't exactly understood (it still isn't, really) but it was acknowledged as a real and debilitating thing that robbed men of their rational senses. The Army knew and appreciated that a man with shellshock fleeing a fight or refusing to go forward wasn't demonstrating basic cowardice or disobedience.
But the Army was equally afraid that if it became known in the trenches that shellshock was seen as a 'ticket out' or an 'excuse', then morale, discipline and fighting spirit would collapse.
So the most common response for shellshock cases was to (sometimes literally) 'slap them out of it' - which actually worked a surprising amount of time. If it was an unmanageable case, the man had to be evacuated as quickly as possible so his display of fear and moral collapse (however unintentional) didn't undermine the rest of his unit.
Shellshock cases were taken to hospitals (and later specialised recovery institutions). Shellshock was accepted as a mitigating factor in disciplinary hearings and courts-martial. As the statistics above show, the vast majority of courts were understanding and lenient, and so were the high command who commuted most of the sentences that did cross their desks.
If you want to see real contemporary examples of high-ranking callousness, look at the execution rates (and some of the literal decimation or collective punishments) handed down by the French or Italian armies in WW1.
The British Army was far more paternal and understanding than most of their Allies, which is demonstrated by the fact that the British Army alone in WW1 had no large-scale collapses of morale and no widespread mutinies.
2xChevrons - absolutely spot on. Anyone who has read anything remotely objective about WW1 will tell you the whole "Lions led by donkeys" is wrong. Even the quote and its attribution is wrong, Clarke made it up
It will take time, but there needs to be a continued review and reappraisal, especially of Haigh.
Lloyd George is much to blame for his vilification, some deserved but mostly, not
It will take time, but there needs to be a continued review and reappraisal, especially of Haigh.
Lloyd George is much to blame for his vilification, some deserved but mostly, not
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