What Ails Porsche
Discussion
I recently did a bit of a dive into Porsche's issues. Here's the 1st part of it:
What Ails Porsche?
On July 18, Reuters (see: Reuters Porsche Article) reported that Porsche CEO Oliver Blume stated in a letter to Porsche’s leadership:
“Our business model that sustained us over many decades no longer is functioning today in its current form. Business conditions have deteriorated massively within a short period of time.”
And that:
"In the second half of 2025, employer and employee representatives will negotiate a second structural package to secure the company's long-term performance"
Porsche’s sales peaked in 2023 at 330k cars delivered. In 2025, they are on track for 290k. The model has not been functioning for a while now. What has changed is that it’s no longer deniable, and Blume is finally coming clean on it. When I took a look at Porsche’s 1st half 2024 results (see: Porsche's 1st Half 2024 Results), I stated:
With supply issues likely to continue well into the 2nd half, on-going challenges in China, and a big bet on EVs that’s looking rather untimely right now, even the lower guidance that Porsche just issued for 2024 looks ambitious.
And that was the polite version. A year later, all of these issues remain, and you can now add a fourth to the list: US Auto Tariffs. To top it all off, Porsche has a part-time CEO and a largely new executive board at a time when the wheels are clearly coming off. I would classify the issues into two groups:
1. self-inflicted/own goals
2. external challenges
1. Self-inflected/Own Goals
In the self-inflicted/own goals category, I would put China, EVs and management. Looking at each in a bit more detail:
China
Porsche has been widely unsuccessful at stopping the bleeding in China for the last several years. In 2021, Porsche sold 97k cars in China, Porsche’s largest market, and it represented 32% of total vehicles delivered. By 2023, China’s share had dropped to 25%. In 2024, China’s share of Porsche’s total retail sales was down to 18%, with sales of around 56k vehicles. In the 1st half of 2025, China’s share was 14.5% which straight lines roughly to sales of 42k vehicles in FY 2025. In four years, Porsche’s business in China has more than halved and it is continuing to drop. Annual sales of 25k vehicles is likely where it will bottom out.
This China trend of boom and then bust is a risk Porsche executives should have been well aware of and prepared for. It’s very much the same well documented trend most multinational consumer product companies have gone through in China over recent decades. The Chinese market is anything but a level, transparent playing field. As quickly as you are able to grow a business in China, they have the ability to take it away. Porsche’s biggest mistake was getting addicted to the revenue and building out structure to support a business that was never going to last.
Ferrari has a self-imposed China limit of 10% of sales. Porsche would have been wise to follow Ferrari’s lead.
EVs
Porsche’s portfolio issues can be related directly back to a decision taken back in 2022 to bet heavily on EVs. The original plan called for 50% of sales being in hybrids and EVs by 2025, rising to 80% pure EVs in 2030. In 2024, 12.7% of Porsche’s sales were in EVs and sales of its flagship EV, the Taycan, dropped by 49%. In terms of strategic blunders, this one isn’t too far off the Austrian Hussars who refused to share their schnapps at the Battle of Karánsebes. What makes it quite surprising is Porsche’s core customers are a highly engaged and enthusiastic group. Had Porsche done its homework and asked this group the right questions, I am positive 80% EVs in 2030 is not the answer they would have gotten. Why it took Porsche so long to figure this out is a mystery, but it appears they finally have. In the last earnings call, Blume did deliver a bit of a mea culpa in his opening statement:
“The global rapid EV ramp-up has not yet materialised. Although the ramp-up of electromobility has slowed down in some regions, we continue to see electromobility as the technology of the future. And we want to make it a success in the long term. Our product strategy would still allow for the goal of delivering more than 80% fully electric sports cars by 2030. In view of market developments, however, this is no longer realistic. Our ramp-up will therefore adapt to the market developments. As currently we anticipate a much longer transition phase, we have taken this as an opportunity to revise our product planning in specific areas.
“As before, our product strategy includes a balanced range of combustion engines, hybrids and electric sports cars. We are expanding and extending our portfolio of hybrid and combustion engine models. At the same time, we are strengthening our brand core with emotional combustion engine vehicles.”
It’s that last line that sums up Porsche’s huge insights miss on what its customer really wants from a sports car brand. It’s emotional, combustion-engine vehicles - and right now EVs can’t deliver that emotional experience. Back in 2023 at the Financial Times Future of the Car Summit, McLaren’s then CEO, Michael Leiter, said he was not sold on EV as a powertrain solution for supercars given both the weight and lack of emotion. Given that Leiter started his career at Porsche and prior to joining McLaren was Ferrari’s Chief Technology Officer, that was a hugely powerful statement based on an in-depth understanding of the technology. Porsche certainly would have been aware of this and would have done well to heed Michael’s advice.
The cost of the EV miss is €800 million and counting. While Porsche is finally pivoting back to ICE and hybrids, a lot of damage has been done.
Part-time CEO
Herr Blume
Porsche AG CEO Oliver Blume also serves as the CEO of Volkswagen AG. Given the shared leadership, it’s not surprising that both Volkswagen and Porsche are facing many of the same issues due to the same strategic missteps in leadership direction. Both companies are quite sizeable and highly complex in their own right. When the issue of Porsche effectively having a part time CEO was brought up on the latest earnings calls, Blume rather testily replied:
“Yes, a very fair, fair question. And first of all, my intention is to do both jobs 100%, and it's up to my organization to do so. And as you know, from the beginning on, it was carefully thought to do both jobs at the same time. But the double role is not designed forever being very clear here. And I will do it as long as we have some big issues to solve. I hope we were able to show you yesterday how the restructuring in Volkswagen Group is advancing. And this was only possible, it was a double role with the power of the double role and the independency.
“For example, only the agreements we have taken at the end of last year, they were historical. They have never happened in the past and only with a double role it was possible to bring this change into -- in the Volkswagen Group beside of all the technical and strategic decisions we've shown yesterday. For Porsche, the double role still has got big advantages when you look to all the political discussions, I combine both roles with my Volkswagen role, I'm possible to talk to the highest authorities in China to the U.S. when it comes to tariffs and other agreements. I put Porsche into this negotiations only with the partial role, I would have never been able to get at this level to talk to them. They are completely different and when you see the software agreements we have taken with Rivian, where Porsche now plays a big part into this benefiting from a future-based one architecture that was possible with my double role.
“And so, I think up to now, it works quite well. It's my organisation. And in a certain time, I will decide to leave one of the jobs.”
While it is physically impossible for Blume to do both jobs 100% as he claims, I do buy Blume’s argument that his twin CEO hats give Porsche political access in China that it might not be able to get without Volkswagen’s weight behind it. Given Porsche’s results in China, the tangible benefits of this access are quite nebulous. On all the other examples that Blume cites, I am much less convinced. At the end of the day, Porsche AG and Volkswagen AG are both controlled by Porsche SE. Both “AGs” have multiple members of the supervisory boards in common, which should be more than enough to ensure the cross sharing of technology platforms and manufacturing capacity across both businesses.
As for the software agreement and investment in Rivian, why they are investing multiple billions and tying themselves to a struggling US EV/SUV manufacturer with declining sales is beyond me. Given Porsche’s major strategic missteps on China and EVs, if I sat on Porsche’s supervisory board, I would certainly be challenging the dual CEO role. Stellantis and Ferrari are in a similar situation with Exor as a controlling shareholder and they certainly do not share a CEO. Ferrari’s market cap is more than twice Porsche AG’s. As for Blume referring to Porsche as “my organisation”, the statement does tend to imply a top-down dictatorial type approach that might just happen to be a key contributor to the China and EV messes. Also, the comment that “in a certain time, I will decide to leave one of the jobs” is quite dismissive of the fact that Blume reports to a supervisory board. Last I checked, CEO succession was a board-level decision.
Most people who hold two jobs do it as they need the money to make ends meet. As Blume made a bit over €10 million in 2024, he can probably afford to give up one of the two roles.
What Ails Porsche?
On July 18, Reuters (see: Reuters Porsche Article) reported that Porsche CEO Oliver Blume stated in a letter to Porsche’s leadership:
“Our business model that sustained us over many decades no longer is functioning today in its current form. Business conditions have deteriorated massively within a short period of time.”
And that:
"In the second half of 2025, employer and employee representatives will negotiate a second structural package to secure the company's long-term performance"
Porsche’s sales peaked in 2023 at 330k cars delivered. In 2025, they are on track for 290k. The model has not been functioning for a while now. What has changed is that it’s no longer deniable, and Blume is finally coming clean on it. When I took a look at Porsche’s 1st half 2024 results (see: Porsche's 1st Half 2024 Results), I stated:
With supply issues likely to continue well into the 2nd half, on-going challenges in China, and a big bet on EVs that’s looking rather untimely right now, even the lower guidance that Porsche just issued for 2024 looks ambitious.
And that was the polite version. A year later, all of these issues remain, and you can now add a fourth to the list: US Auto Tariffs. To top it all off, Porsche has a part-time CEO and a largely new executive board at a time when the wheels are clearly coming off. I would classify the issues into two groups:
1. self-inflicted/own goals
2. external challenges
1. Self-inflected/Own Goals
In the self-inflicted/own goals category, I would put China, EVs and management. Looking at each in a bit more detail:
China
Porsche has been widely unsuccessful at stopping the bleeding in China for the last several years. In 2021, Porsche sold 97k cars in China, Porsche’s largest market, and it represented 32% of total vehicles delivered. By 2023, China’s share had dropped to 25%. In 2024, China’s share of Porsche’s total retail sales was down to 18%, with sales of around 56k vehicles. In the 1st half of 2025, China’s share was 14.5% which straight lines roughly to sales of 42k vehicles in FY 2025. In four years, Porsche’s business in China has more than halved and it is continuing to drop. Annual sales of 25k vehicles is likely where it will bottom out.
This China trend of boom and then bust is a risk Porsche executives should have been well aware of and prepared for. It’s very much the same well documented trend most multinational consumer product companies have gone through in China over recent decades. The Chinese market is anything but a level, transparent playing field. As quickly as you are able to grow a business in China, they have the ability to take it away. Porsche’s biggest mistake was getting addicted to the revenue and building out structure to support a business that was never going to last.
Ferrari has a self-imposed China limit of 10% of sales. Porsche would have been wise to follow Ferrari’s lead.
EVs
Porsche’s portfolio issues can be related directly back to a decision taken back in 2022 to bet heavily on EVs. The original plan called for 50% of sales being in hybrids and EVs by 2025, rising to 80% pure EVs in 2030. In 2024, 12.7% of Porsche’s sales were in EVs and sales of its flagship EV, the Taycan, dropped by 49%. In terms of strategic blunders, this one isn’t too far off the Austrian Hussars who refused to share their schnapps at the Battle of Karánsebes. What makes it quite surprising is Porsche’s core customers are a highly engaged and enthusiastic group. Had Porsche done its homework and asked this group the right questions, I am positive 80% EVs in 2030 is not the answer they would have gotten. Why it took Porsche so long to figure this out is a mystery, but it appears they finally have. In the last earnings call, Blume did deliver a bit of a mea culpa in his opening statement:
“The global rapid EV ramp-up has not yet materialised. Although the ramp-up of electromobility has slowed down in some regions, we continue to see electromobility as the technology of the future. And we want to make it a success in the long term. Our product strategy would still allow for the goal of delivering more than 80% fully electric sports cars by 2030. In view of market developments, however, this is no longer realistic. Our ramp-up will therefore adapt to the market developments. As currently we anticipate a much longer transition phase, we have taken this as an opportunity to revise our product planning in specific areas.
“As before, our product strategy includes a balanced range of combustion engines, hybrids and electric sports cars. We are expanding and extending our portfolio of hybrid and combustion engine models. At the same time, we are strengthening our brand core with emotional combustion engine vehicles.”
It’s that last line that sums up Porsche’s huge insights miss on what its customer really wants from a sports car brand. It’s emotional, combustion-engine vehicles - and right now EVs can’t deliver that emotional experience. Back in 2023 at the Financial Times Future of the Car Summit, McLaren’s then CEO, Michael Leiter, said he was not sold on EV as a powertrain solution for supercars given both the weight and lack of emotion. Given that Leiter started his career at Porsche and prior to joining McLaren was Ferrari’s Chief Technology Officer, that was a hugely powerful statement based on an in-depth understanding of the technology. Porsche certainly would have been aware of this and would have done well to heed Michael’s advice.
The cost of the EV miss is €800 million and counting. While Porsche is finally pivoting back to ICE and hybrids, a lot of damage has been done.
Part-time CEO
Herr Blume
Porsche AG CEO Oliver Blume also serves as the CEO of Volkswagen AG. Given the shared leadership, it’s not surprising that both Volkswagen and Porsche are facing many of the same issues due to the same strategic missteps in leadership direction. Both companies are quite sizeable and highly complex in their own right. When the issue of Porsche effectively having a part time CEO was brought up on the latest earnings calls, Blume rather testily replied:
“Yes, a very fair, fair question. And first of all, my intention is to do both jobs 100%, and it's up to my organization to do so. And as you know, from the beginning on, it was carefully thought to do both jobs at the same time. But the double role is not designed forever being very clear here. And I will do it as long as we have some big issues to solve. I hope we were able to show you yesterday how the restructuring in Volkswagen Group is advancing. And this was only possible, it was a double role with the power of the double role and the independency.
“For example, only the agreements we have taken at the end of last year, they were historical. They have never happened in the past and only with a double role it was possible to bring this change into -- in the Volkswagen Group beside of all the technical and strategic decisions we've shown yesterday. For Porsche, the double role still has got big advantages when you look to all the political discussions, I combine both roles with my Volkswagen role, I'm possible to talk to the highest authorities in China to the U.S. when it comes to tariffs and other agreements. I put Porsche into this negotiations only with the partial role, I would have never been able to get at this level to talk to them. They are completely different and when you see the software agreements we have taken with Rivian, where Porsche now plays a big part into this benefiting from a future-based one architecture that was possible with my double role.
“And so, I think up to now, it works quite well. It's my organisation. And in a certain time, I will decide to leave one of the jobs.”
While it is physically impossible for Blume to do both jobs 100% as he claims, I do buy Blume’s argument that his twin CEO hats give Porsche political access in China that it might not be able to get without Volkswagen’s weight behind it. Given Porsche’s results in China, the tangible benefits of this access are quite nebulous. On all the other examples that Blume cites, I am much less convinced. At the end of the day, Porsche AG and Volkswagen AG are both controlled by Porsche SE. Both “AGs” have multiple members of the supervisory boards in common, which should be more than enough to ensure the cross sharing of technology platforms and manufacturing capacity across both businesses.
As for the software agreement and investment in Rivian, why they are investing multiple billions and tying themselves to a struggling US EV/SUV manufacturer with declining sales is beyond me. Given Porsche’s major strategic missteps on China and EVs, if I sat on Porsche’s supervisory board, I would certainly be challenging the dual CEO role. Stellantis and Ferrari are in a similar situation with Exor as a controlling shareholder and they certainly do not share a CEO. Ferrari’s market cap is more than twice Porsche AG’s. As for Blume referring to Porsche as “my organisation”, the statement does tend to imply a top-down dictatorial type approach that might just happen to be a key contributor to the China and EV messes. Also, the comment that “in a certain time, I will decide to leave one of the jobs” is quite dismissive of the fact that Blume reports to a supervisory board. Last I checked, CEO succession was a board-level decision.
Most people who hold two jobs do it as they need the money to make ends meet. As Blume made a bit over €10 million in 2024, he can probably afford to give up one of the two roles.
Bragging about how much money you are making out of your customers whilst simultaneously alienating legacy customers by refusing to sell them the new car that they wanted, was a very bad move.
They allowed their OPC's to play the dirtiest of games ... even on finance (which was visibly milking their customers) resulting in a significant oversupply of the market.
Of course this was driven by their ambition to float, it was therefore a short term game plan which added to recent events is now crucifying them.
The fact also that their volume cars are polished VW's and recent technical issues has also brought into question the depth of their engineering.
This is tough, because at their heart they still make very good sports cars .... but where now are their customers ?
They allowed their OPC's to play the dirtiest of games ... even on finance (which was visibly milking their customers) resulting in a significant oversupply of the market.
Of course this was driven by their ambition to float, it was therefore a short term game plan which added to recent events is now crucifying them.
The fact also that their volume cars are polished VW's and recent technical issues has also brought into question the depth of their engineering.
This is tough, because at their heart they still make very good sports cars .... but where now are their customers ?
EVs are s
t and they back 80% of the company on the kind of eco vomit spiel our PH eco shills excel in producing gallons of daily.
It’s pretty obvious the whole ICE ban crap will be reversed across most of the civilised world in due course as the pendulum swings back from the misguided extreme woke era.
More ICE fk bullst unworkable eco legislation, that needs to be the new Porsche strategy. fk the eco wokes.
t and they back 80% of the company on the kind of eco vomit spiel our PH eco shills excel in producing gallons of daily.It’s pretty obvious the whole ICE ban crap will be reversed across most of the civilised world in due course as the pendulum swings back from the misguided extreme woke era.
More ICE f
k bullst unworkable eco legislation, that needs to be the new Porsche strategy. fk the eco wokes.Maybe if they hadn't been smart arses in the markets and tried to swallow a whale which promptly turned round and had them for breakfast, they might have been focussed on offering the best to their customers rather than pleasing the corporate monster that is VAG.
Arrogance before a fall?
Plus I think the Chinese are handing VAG including Porsche their respective arses in the EV market.
Arrogance before a fall?
Plus I think the Chinese are handing VAG including Porsche their respective arses in the EV market.
Inbox said:
Maybe the arrogance and assumption that customers are walking wallets to be used and abused has come home to roost.
Of all my automotive experiences, Porsche have been the worst by a country mile!
Corporate greed and a slavish addiction to the EV addiction the EU bureauprats fed and dictated to them.Of all my automotive experiences, Porsche have been the worst by a country mile!
What goes round comes round, and then some.
You can only trade for so long on your history as a sports car maker. The 911 Turbo Athena poster can only be re-framed so many times.
You can dilute that for a bit and get away with it. But when you try to become all things to all men: Boxster > SUV > Saloon > Small SUV and you've gone everywhere you can go (Porsche light commercial van?) and you've made yourself just another German car maker. Porsches are everywhere and they don't turn heads anymore. They have lost their cachet.
You've done all of that in a period of relative global wealth, when your aspirational middle-class customer has had access to cheap money.
But you've made your product generic and not special anymore. There are many economic pressures upon your customers, they can no longer borrow so cheaply. You cannot move your product up market any more than BMW or Mercedes can, because that space is occupied by Ferrari, Bentley, Lamborghini, Rolls Royce (and your parent owns half of them anyway).
So, you've leveraged your history really well and made astonishing profits in the process. But it's a trick that won't work anymore, your customer doesn't see your products as worth over-extending for now and, even if they did, they wouldn't have the money to buy them.
What is the solution? There isn't one. We are back in an time where only the very wealthy can afford cars that are really set apart from the run-of the-mill.
That's my take on where the brand is in the product life cycle.
You can dilute that for a bit and get away with it. But when you try to become all things to all men: Boxster > SUV > Saloon > Small SUV and you've gone everywhere you can go (Porsche light commercial van?) and you've made yourself just another German car maker. Porsches are everywhere and they don't turn heads anymore. They have lost their cachet.
You've done all of that in a period of relative global wealth, when your aspirational middle-class customer has had access to cheap money.
But you've made your product generic and not special anymore. There are many economic pressures upon your customers, they can no longer borrow so cheaply. You cannot move your product up market any more than BMW or Mercedes can, because that space is occupied by Ferrari, Bentley, Lamborghini, Rolls Royce (and your parent owns half of them anyway).
So, you've leveraged your history really well and made astonishing profits in the process. But it's a trick that won't work anymore, your customer doesn't see your products as worth over-extending for now and, even if they did, they wouldn't have the money to buy them.
What is the solution? There isn't one. We are back in an time where only the very wealthy can afford cars that are really set apart from the run-of the-mill.
That's my take on where the brand is in the product life cycle.
Inbox said:
Maybe if they hadn't been smart arses in the markets and tried to swallow a whale which promptly turned round and had them for breakfast, they might have been focussed on offering the best to their customers rather than pleasing the corporate monster that is VAG.
It's hard not to think that WW (because I can't be arsed to google how to spell his name) has a lot to answer for.Count897 said:
EVs are st and they back 80% of the company on the kind of eco vomit spiel our PH eco shills excel in producing gallons of daily.
It’s pretty obvious the whole ICE ban crap will be reversed across most of the civilised world in due course as the pendulum swings back from the misguided extreme woke era.
More ICE fk bullst unworkable eco legislation, that needs to be the new Porsche strategy. fk the eco wokes.
Have you checked your blood pressure recently? You don't have to use an electric monitor, manual ones are still available.t and they back 80% of the company on the kind of eco vomit spiel our PH eco shills excel in producing gallons of daily.It’s pretty obvious the whole ICE ban crap will be reversed across most of the civilised world in due course as the pendulum swings back from the misguided extreme woke era.
More ICE f
k bullst unworkable eco legislation, that needs to be the new Porsche strategy. fk the eco wokes.Stick Legs said:
Inbox said:
Maybe the arrogance and assumption that customers are walking wallets to be used and abused has come home to roost.
This, and the fact that their core product isn't the cars they actually make in volume.Maxym said:
OP, which of all that are your words and which are from an article?
By definition aren’t own goals self-inflicted?
The OP is SSOreport.com where all the articles and data is available in full with a free sign up. By definition aren’t own goals self-inflicted?
I believe it was a spin off from the original financial reports that used to be in EVO back in the day? I might be wrong of course.
PRO5T said:
Inbox said:
Maybe if they hadn't been smart arses in the markets and tried to swallow a whale which promptly turned round and had them for breakfast, they might have been focussed on offering the best to their customers rather than pleasing the corporate monster that is VAG.
It's hard not to think that WW (because I can't be arsed to google how to spell his name) has a lot to answer for.They sounds like a Bond villan and sidekick.
Inbox said:
Maybe if they hadn't been smart arses in the markets and tried to swallow a whale which promptly turned round and had them for breakfast, they might have been focussed on offering the best to their customers rather than pleasing the corporate monster that is VAG.
Arrogance before a fall?
Not quite, as Porsche SE ended up controlling VW after that debacle presided over by Wiedeking as part of his battle with Piëch, the Porsche and Piech families always controlled both it was an internal family argument around the structure, with Wiedeking as the front man on one side, Wiedeking lost. Arrogance before a fall?
Porsche’s slide started the moment it went public. The IPO unlocked billions, but it also locked the company into one mission: keep the shareholders happy. That’s why they went all-in on EVs (chasing fatter margins) and doubled down on China—two bets that have now blown up in their face.
Porsche isn’t Ferrari, and never will be. Ferrari plays the scarcity game; Porsche plays the volume game. Ferrari protects its sporting DNA. Porsche’s been milking the badge on Cayennes, Macans, and Taycans. One brand builds dreams; the other builds whatever sells.
The so-called halo cars? Porsche’s halo models simply don’t cast a big enough halo to carry the brand. Most people can’t even get near them. Allocations are very limited, and OPCs often hand them to the same ‘preferred’ customers who flip or hoard rather than using them to grow the brand’s enthusiast base. The supply of these cars should have increased, and allocations should have been determined by Porsche AG, not the OPC, and not even Porsche GB.
The focus shifted from cars for driving enthusiasts to luxury goods for brand enthusiasts. Prices are up, profits are down, the brand’s diluted, and even the 911 is starting to look like just another SKU in a corporate product catalogue. This was never a viable business model, just a short-term cash grab. In the end, you reap what you sow, and Porsche and its dealers are suffering the errors of their ways.
Porsche isn’t Ferrari, and never will be. Ferrari plays the scarcity game; Porsche plays the volume game. Ferrari protects its sporting DNA. Porsche’s been milking the badge on Cayennes, Macans, and Taycans. One brand builds dreams; the other builds whatever sells.
The so-called halo cars? Porsche’s halo models simply don’t cast a big enough halo to carry the brand. Most people can’t even get near them. Allocations are very limited, and OPCs often hand them to the same ‘preferred’ customers who flip or hoard rather than using them to grow the brand’s enthusiast base. The supply of these cars should have increased, and allocations should have been determined by Porsche AG, not the OPC, and not even Porsche GB.
The focus shifted from cars for driving enthusiasts to luxury goods for brand enthusiasts. Prices are up, profits are down, the brand’s diluted, and even the 911 is starting to look like just another SKU in a corporate product catalogue. This was never a viable business model, just a short-term cash grab. In the end, you reap what you sow, and Porsche and its dealers are suffering the errors of their ways.
It's simple really, they went from a niche brand, a once proud brand that we all lusted after as a "one day" car, to a brand that was spreading itself thinly to satisfy the hungry beast that is VAG. They didn't have a choice really; TVR, Lotus, Lamborghini, Bentley, Rolls Royce, Aston Martin, Jaguar etc, stood alone once, not now.
Pop into your local OPC and you'll be confused; 911's (various iterations), Caymans, Boxsters, EV's, Panamera's. There's too much going on.
The cars are too expensive in 2025. The decision not to give the customer what they wanted and the whole GT product malarkey alienated trusted customers, customers that now drive AMG's, Aston Martins, Ferrari's. Further, and the elephant in the room, fast cars are useless; too fast, complicated, expensive to run and no longer exclusive. A Model S is just as fast, cheaper to run, can carry the kids and you can watch YT while your wife is shopping.
Where they're fortunate however, is that they're part of VAG. The decision could come for them to specialise in a slimmed down model sector, leaving the slack to be taken over by VW, SEAT, Audi. They're safe - for now.
Pop into your local OPC and you'll be confused; 911's (various iterations), Caymans, Boxsters, EV's, Panamera's. There's too much going on.
The cars are too expensive in 2025. The decision not to give the customer what they wanted and the whole GT product malarkey alienated trusted customers, customers that now drive AMG's, Aston Martins, Ferrari's. Further, and the elephant in the room, fast cars are useless; too fast, complicated, expensive to run and no longer exclusive. A Model S is just as fast, cheaper to run, can carry the kids and you can watch YT while your wife is shopping.
Where they're fortunate however, is that they're part of VAG. The decision could come for them to specialise in a slimmed down model sector, leaving the slack to be taken over by VW, SEAT, Audi. They're safe - for now.
Edited by maz8062 on Sunday 10th August 15:37
Sierra Mike said:
The focus shifted from cars for driving enthusiasts to luxury goods for brand enthusiasts. Prices are up, profits are down, the brand’s diluted, and even the 911 is starting to look like just another SKU in a corporate product catalogue. This was never a viable business model, just a short-term cash grab. In the end, you reap what you sow, and Porsche and its dealers are suffering the errors of their ways.
maz8062 said:
They didn't have a choice really; TVR, Lotus, Lamborghini, Bentley, Rolls Royce, Aston Martin, Jaguar etc, stood alone once, not now...
...The cars are too expensive in 2025. The decision not to give the customer what they wanted and the whole GT product malarkey alienated trusted customers, customers that now drive AMG's, Aston Martins, Ferrari's. Further, and the elephant in the room, fast cars are useless; too fast, complicated, expensive to run and no longer exclusive. A Model S is just as fast, cheaper to run, can carry the kids and you can watch YT while your wife is shopping.
Both of these are on point....The cars are too expensive in 2025. The decision not to give the customer what they wanted and the whole GT product malarkey alienated trusted customers, customers that now drive AMG's, Aston Martins, Ferrari's. Further, and the elephant in the room, fast cars are useless; too fast, complicated, expensive to run and no longer exclusive. A Model S is just as fast, cheaper to run, can carry the kids and you can watch YT while your wife is shopping.
If you see a new 911 Turbo you expect to see a bloke in his late 60's. If you see a 911 GT3 you expect to see a influencer.
The enthusiast market, where the 911 used to be is I assume buying either Caymans or older 911s.
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