Roger Mark Boisjoly
Discussion
Roger Mark Boisjoly (April 25, 1938 – January 6, 2012) was an American mechanical engineer, fluid dynamicist and an aerodynamicist who worked for Morton Thiokol, the manufacturer of the solid rocket boosters for the Space Shuttle program.
Following the announcement that the Challenger mission was confirmed for January 28, 1986, Boisjoly and his colleagues tried to stop the flight. Temperatures were due to be down to −1 °C overnight. Boisjoly felt that this would severely compromise the safety of the O-ring, and potentially lose the flight.
The matter was discussed with Morton Thiokol managers, who agreed that the issue was serious enough to recommend delaying the flight. They arranged a telephone conference with NASA management and gave their findings. However, after a while, the Morton Thiokol managers asked for a few minutes off the phone to discuss their final position again.
Despite the efforts of Boisjoly and others in this off-line briefing, the Morton Thiokol managers decided to advise NASA that their data was inconclusive. NASA asked if there were objections. Hearing none, the decision to fly the ill-fated STS-51L Challenger mission was made.
Boisjoly's concerns proved correct. In the first moments after ignition, the O-rings failed completely and were burned away, resulting in the black puff of smoke visible on films of the launch. This left only a layer of aluminum oxide (a combustion product) to seal the joint. At 59 seconds after launch, buffeted by high-altitude winds, the oxide gave way. Hot gases streamed out of the joint in a visible torch-like plume that burned into the external hydrogen tank. At about 73 seconds, the adjacent SRB strut gave way and the vehicle quickly disintegrated.
Boisjoly was quite relieved when the flight lifted off, as his investigations had predicted that the SRB would explode during the initial take-off. Seventy-three seconds later he witnessed the shuttle disaster on television.
After the Shuttle disaster, Boisjoly was painfully rewarded for his foresight and playing the part of a whistle blower by releasing his reports publicly. Thiokol cut him off from space work, and he was shunned by colleagues and managers. A former friend warned him, "If you wreck this company, I’m going to put my kids on your doorstep," Boisjoly told The Los Angeles Times in 1987.
He had headaches, double-vision and depression, he said. He yelled at his dog and his daughters and skipped church to avoid people. He filed two suits against Thiokol; both were dismissed.
He later said he was sustained by a single gesture of support. Sally Ride, the first American woman in space, hugged him after his appearance before the commission.
"She was the only one," he said in a whisper to a Newsday reporter in 1988. "The only one."
It's not as simple as that.
You can see that it wasn't just executives who vented their ire at him. It seems that much of the workforce at Morton were antagonistic to his stance. To them, he was being disloyal - and putting all their livelihoods at risk.
Sadly, making a stand hardly ever wins you any friends - even if you think you are right and are later proved to be right.
We have seen the same phenomenon when whistleblowers exposed wrongdoings in care homes or in the NHS.
You can see that it wasn't just executives who vented their ire at him. It seems that much of the workforce at Morton were antagonistic to his stance. To them, he was being disloyal - and putting all their livelihoods at risk.
Sadly, making a stand hardly ever wins you any friends - even if you think you are right and are later proved to be right.
We have seen the same phenomenon when whistleblowers exposed wrongdoings in care homes or in the NHS.
This will make you cringe.
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/challenger-coun...
One of the many sad things about this was that at least some of the crew survived the explosion and died when the cabin pressure capsule hit the sea.
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/challenger-coun...
One of the many sad things about this was that at least some of the crew survived the explosion and died when the cabin pressure capsule hit the sea.
Simpo Two said:
Could it have had an escape pod like an F-111...? Too much weight perhaps.
Weight, cost to develop and deadline pressure probably, just like our V-bombers; escape pods and ejector seats for all crew were discussed, but the budget and weight costs and the added development time were deemed unacceptable by the men from the ministry. Thus escaping from V-bombers if you weren't a pilot was a bit dodgy.Thing is, there is no "right" view on this is there. If you gave every engineer on the program the absolute right to veto any action, the program would simply stop in it's tracks.
On something as complex and risky as the shuttle, EVERY flight was a huge risk. The crew knew that.
Managers, responsible for moving the project forwards are always going to be less cautious than engineers responsible for one single part or system, that's just the way it is. The Columbia accident, went on to prove that!
The error, imo, was for NASA to fool the public in to thinking that space flight had become "routine" and "everyday", like stepping onto a bus. Now people die in bus crashes everyday, but the probability of them crashing is enormously less than than the ~0.75% chance of a STS critical failure!
On something as complex and risky as the shuttle, EVERY flight was a huge risk. The crew knew that.
Managers, responsible for moving the project forwards are always going to be less cautious than engineers responsible for one single part or system, that's just the way it is. The Columbia accident, went on to prove that!
The error, imo, was for NASA to fool the public in to thinking that space flight had become "routine" and "everyday", like stepping onto a bus. Now people die in bus crashes everyday, but the probability of them crashing is enormously less than than the ~0.75% chance of a STS critical failure!
Max_Torque said:
On something as complex and risky as the shuttle, EVERY flight was a huge risk. The crew knew that.
In the case of Christa Mcauliffe, that is doubtful. NASA received a huge amount of criticism for emphasising the "routineness" of getting into space on the Shuttle and the fact that any "ordinary civilian" could make the trip with minimum training.
I would suggest that the only people who really understood how dangerous the whole contraption was were the test pilots in the astronaut corps - and even they complained that they had not been informed of ALL of the technical issues the Shuttle suffered from.
Pre-Challenger, civilian astronauts, mission specialists, scientists and payload specialists (usually "freebie" rides offered as a "carrot" to potential payload customers)were very much underinformed as to how dangerous the enterprise was.
Eric Mc said:
Max_Torque said:
On something as complex and risky as the shuttle, EVERY flight was a huge risk. The crew knew that.
In the case of Christa Mcauliffe, that is doubtful. NASA received a huge amount of criticism for emphasising the "routineness" of getting into space on the Shuttle and the fact that any "ordinary civilian" could make the trip with minimum training.
I would suggest that the only people who really understood how dangerous the whole contraption was were the test pilots in the astronaut corps - and even they complained that they had not been informed of ALL of the technical issues the Shuttle suffered from.
Pre-Challenger, civilian astronauts, mission specialists, scientists and payload specialists (usually "freebie" rides offered as a "carrot" to potential payload customers)were very much underinformed as to how dangerous the enterprise was.
Through out all stages of crew training, individuals drop out, for many reasons, both physical and psychological, there is plenty of time for those individuals to make their own assessment of the relative risk to reward balance and choose appropriately.
So, we know now, at the end of the program, that 2 out of 135 flights were lost, so roughly, one out of 67 flights. At what point do you as in individual say "it's too risky"? Well, that depends on your outlook on life and to a large degree your social state (dependents, children, family etc).
But i doubt say a reduction in risk to 1 in 60 flights would make a lot of difference.
But, Ok, say getting down to 1 in 30, or 1 in 20, or even 1 in 10, where would you draw the line?
Even knowing the odds, it's a tough call eh!
Chief of the Astronaut Office at the time, and veteran astronaut, John Young, was insistent that NONE of the astronauts were ever told that there was a specific problem with the re-seating of the O rings in cold temperatures.
He was very, very angry about this and expressed this anger very strongly to the Rogers Commission.
I don't think astronauts would give a jot about risk expressed as a percentage or using exotic stats. What they WOULD like to know are specific areas of the engineering of the system that have particular problems - and being kept in the dark about a serious flaw in the design of the Solid Rocket Boosters was a serious "No No".
He was very, very angry about this and expressed this anger very strongly to the Rogers Commission.
I don't think astronauts would give a jot about risk expressed as a percentage or using exotic stats. What they WOULD like to know are specific areas of the engineering of the system that have particular problems - and being kept in the dark about a serious flaw in the design of the Solid Rocket Boosters was a serious "No No".
Eric Mc said:
Chief of the Astronaut Office at the time, and veteran astronaut, John Young, was insistent that NONE of the astronauts were ever told that there was a specific problem with the re-seating of the O rings in cold temperatures.
He was very, very angry about this and expressed this anger very strongly to the Rogers Commission.
I don't think astronauts would give a jot about risk expressed as a percentage or using exotic stats. What they WOULD like to know are specific areas of the engineering of the system that have particular problems - and being kept in the dark about a serious flaw in the design of the Solid Rocket Boosters was a serious "No No".
In general i agree, the crew should be briefed, but on the STS, which has thousands of CRITICAL systems, where do you start? He was very, very angry about this and expressed this anger very strongly to the Rogers Commission.
I don't think astronauts would give a jot about risk expressed as a percentage or using exotic stats. What they WOULD like to know are specific areas of the engineering of the system that have particular problems - and being kept in the dark about a serious flaw in the design of the Solid Rocket Boosters was a serious "No No".
The design "flaw" with the O-ring sealing was only a flaw if it were ignored (which, unfortunately, it was) There have got to be 100's of systems that have similar "flaws" (actually, specific "safe operating areas") and i can't imagine being able to take an accurate overview as to the risks that each posses, without being an expert in that particular arena etc?
(BTW, i am playing Devils Advocate" to some degree here, as there is no "right" or "perfect" answer to these issues, just different shades of gray !! ;-)
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